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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
In 2010, an explosion aboard the “Deepwater 
Horizon”—an oil drilling rig operating on the British Petroleum 
Exploration & Production, Inc., (“BP”) owned “Macondo 
Prospect”—caused the worst oil spill in U.S. history.1  Over 
3,000,000 barrels of oil were spilled, and eleven people were 
killed.2  The environmental damage was catastrophic.3  
                                                          
a1 Law Clerk, Allen County Court of Common Pleas.  J.D., 2017, Ohio 
Northern University College of Law.  Articles Research Editor, Ohio 
Northern University Law Review.  B.A., 2014, University of Akron.  
 
1 Richard Pallardy, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill of 2010, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA [hereinafter Pallardy]  
https://www.britannica.com/event/Deepwater-Horizon-oil-spill-
of-2010 (last visited April 3, 2017). 
2 Pallardy, supra note 1. 
3 Pallardy, supra note 1. 
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Naturally, lawsuits were filed, including In re Deepwater 
Horizon,4 a class action filed against BP and others for damages 
arising from the infamous oil spill.5  The district court certified 
the class and approved a settlement agreement that was 
reached.6  On appeal, BP and others challenged the district 
court’s decision to certify the class and approve the settlement 
agreement.7   
 The crux of the appellants’ argument was that the class 
should have never been certified because it included 
unidentified members and members who incurred no injury as 
a result of the spill.8  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit noted that the United States Supreme Court has never—
at least not in a majority opinion—explicitly addressed the issue 
of whether putative, unnamed class members in a class action 
lawsuit must prove standing before class certification.9  
However, in Lewis v. Casey,10 Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and 
Breyer, in their concurring and dissenting opinion, explained 
that, in the context of standing and class action certification, 
“[u]nnamed plaintiffs need not make any individual showing 
of standing in order to obtain relief, because the standing issue 
focuses on whether the plaintiff is properly before the court, not 
whether represented parties or absent class members are 
properly before the court.”11   
The Fifth Circuit recognized that a minority of 
jurisdictions relied on this opinion when they formulated their 
rule regarding the present issue.12  The court also examined 
cases involving application of the majority rule, which the court 
characterized as “ensur[ing] that absent class members possess 
Article III standing by examining the class definition.”13  
Following the Second Circuit’s decision in Denney, other 
                                                          
4 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014). 
5 See generally id. 
6 Id. at 795. 
7 Id. at 798-99. 
8 See In re Deepwater Horizon. 
9 In re Deepwater Horizon at 798-99. 
10 518 U.S. 343, 395-96 (1996). 
11 In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 800 (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S 
at 395-96).   
12 Id. at 800-01. 
13 Id. at 801 (citing Denney, 443 F.3d at 262). 
 




circuits have followed suit, requiring classes to be defined in 
such a way that nobody within the class—named or 
unnamed—would lack standing.14  Ultimately, after looking at 
both the majority and minority rule, and declining to 
specifically adopt either one, the court held that the class 
possessed standing under either standard.15   
As explained by the Fifth Circuit in In re Deepwater 
Horizon, currently the federal circuits are split on whether 
putative unnamed class members in a class action lawsuit must 
possess standing.16  The majority of circuits hold that a class 
action lawsuit cannot be certified under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 if the class contains members who lack standing.17  
A minority of circuits hold that unnamed putative class 
members need not establish standing; rather, the “cases or 
controversies” requirement is satisfied so long as a class 
representative has standing.18  The United States Supreme 
Court has yet to definitively resolve the issue, and scholars are 
similarly divided over whether the majority or minority 
approach is proper.19  
In addition to describing the differences between Article 
III standing and class certification under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Part II, Part III provides an updated account 
of the circuit split.20  Part IV of this article argues that the 
minority rule is compelled by recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and is consistent with the purpose of class action 
devices.21  First, Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lewis v. Casey 
supports the proposition that the minority rule—that putative 
unnamed class members need not establish standing—is 
                                                          
14 Id.  
15 Id. at 802-05. 
16 See infra Part III. 
17 See infra Part III.a. 
18 See infra Part III.b. 
19 Compare Joshua P. Davis, et. al., The Puzzle of Class Actions with 
Uninjured Members, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 858, (2014) (contending 
that the minority rule is correct), with Theane Evangelis, Bradkey J. 
Hamburger, Article III Standing and Absent Class Members, 64 EMORY 
L. J. 384 (arguing in favor of the majority rule). 
20 See infra Parts II-III. 
21 See infra Part IV. 
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correct.22  Second, the Court’s decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. 
Bouaphakeo not to address the issue of whether a class can be 
certified when absent class members lack standing—even 
though this issue was raised by the petitioner—suggests that 
only named plaintiffs need establish standing.23  This is because 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Court has an 
obligation to address standing, even if the issue was not raised 
by the parties, if the lower court possessed no jurisdiction over 
the case.24  Finally, Part V argues that the purpose of the class 
action device—judicial efficiency—is furthered by the minority 
rule.25  In contrast, the broad rule will result in unnecessary 
prosecution of separate actions by individual class members.26  
 
II. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ARTICLE III STANDING AND  
CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 
A. CLASS CERTIFICATION UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF  
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
A class action lawsuit is a suit where a plaintiff – or 
multiple plaintiffs – represents many individuals where it is 
efficient to do so.27  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide that, before a class action may proceed, a judge must 
                                                          
22 See infra Part IV. 
23 See infra Part IV. 
24 See infra Part IV. 
25 See infra Part V. 
26 See infra Part V. 
27 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (Bryan A. Garner ed.,10th ed. 
2014) (A class action lawsuit is a suit where “the convenience either 
of the public or of the interested parties requires that the case be 
settled through litigation by or against only a part of the group of 
similarly situated persons and in which a person whose interests are 
or may be affected does not have an opportunity to protect his or her 
interests by appearing personally or through a personally selected 
representative, or through a person specially appointed to act as a 
trustee or guardian.”); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 
700-01 (1979) (a class action suit is an “exception to the usual rule 
that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named 
parties only.”).  
 




“certify” the class.28  For certification, several requirements 
must be met.29  First, under Rule 23(a), a party may sue as a 
representative plaintiff only if: (1) joining all members would 
be impracticable because of the number of class members; (2) 
the class has common questions of law or fact; (3) the 
representatives have claims or defenses typical of those of the 
class; and (4) the interests of the class would be protected by the 
representatives.30  Next, one of the requirements in Rule 23(b) 
must be met, specifically (1) separate actions would create a risk 
of inconsistent or varying adjudications or would be dispositive 
of non-party interests or substantially impair the ability to 
protect their interests; (2) injunctive relief or declaratory relief 
is appropriate; or (3) questions of law or fact predominate over 
questions affecting individual members and a class action is 
superior to other available methods.31  If Rule 23(a) and (b) are 
both satisfied, a judge may certify the class.32  However, “[t]he 
Supreme Court has required district courts to conduct a 
‘rigorous analysis’ into whether the prerequisites of Rule 23 are 
met before certifying a class.”33  
To illustrate, in the case of In re American Medical 
Systems, Inc.,34 a subsidiary of Pfizer, American Medical 
Systems (“AMS”), created certain prosthetics.35  The 
representative plaintiff,Paul Vorhis, was injured by a prosthesis 
manufactured by AMS, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Ohio, alleging, among other claims, 
negligence, breach of warranties, and strict products liability.36  
In its brief in opposition to Vorhis’ motion for certification, AMS 
argued that: (1) Vorhis would not adequately protect the 
                                                          
28 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
29 See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c). 
33 In re American Medical Systems, Inc. 75 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 (1996) 
(citing General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)).  “The trial 
court has broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class, but 
that discretion must be exercised within the framework of Rule 23.”  
In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d at 1079. 
34 75 F.3d 1069 (1996). 
35 Id. at 1074. 
36 Id.  
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interests of other class members because his psychiatric 
condition rendered him irrational; (2) Vorhis’ claim was not 
typical of that of other class members because his problems 
with the prosthesis arose from his unique health conditions; 
and (3) Vorhis only had issues with one type of prosthesis; thus, 
he could not represent other class members who had problems 
with the other types of prostheses manufactured by AMS.37   
In response, Vorhis’ psychiatrist testified that, despite 
his conditions, Vorhis was competent to withstand trial.38  
Vorhis also argued that even though he only had issues with 
one of the prostheses, the designs of the others were basically 
the same; thus, he could fairly represent other class members 
who had issues with the different models.39  The district court 
judge issued an order which conditioned class certification on 
Vorhis amending his complaint to add other representative 
plaintiffs to the case.40  The order appeared to stem from the 
judge’s concerns about the ability of Vorhis to fairly represent 
the class.41  After Vorhis amended his complaint to add more 
representative plaintiffs, the court certified the class.42  The 
defendants filed a writ of mandamus with the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, seeking to vacate the district 
court’s decision to certify Vorhis’ action.43   
The Sixth Circuit first noted that a class may not be 
certifiable simply because the pleadings say it is so.44  
According to the court, “[t]here must be an adequate statement 
of the basic facts to indicate that each requirement of the rule is 
fulfilled.”45  This burden lies with the party moving for class 
certification.46  Next, the court discussed the first element 
required for certification—that the class be numerous so as to 
                                                          
37 Id. at 1075. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1075-76. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. at 1076. 
43 Id. at 1077. 
44 Id. at 1079 (citing Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569, 571 
(6th Cir. 1970)). 
45 Id. at 1079 (quoting Weathers v. Peters Realty Corp., 499 F.2d 1197, 
1200 (6th Cir. 1974)). 
46 Id. at 1079. 
 




render joinder impracticable—and noted that this element was 
easily met.47  Indeed, the district court found that the number of 
class members could be anywhere between 15,000 and 
120,000.48  Nor did defendants dispute that this element was 
satisfied.49 
Second, the court addressed the “commonality” 
requirement in Rule 23(a).50  In order to satisfy this element, 
there must be issues of law or fact common to all members of 
the class.51  The court held that this element was not satisfied.52  
The court reasoned that, because Vorhis’ complaint contained 
conclusory allegations regarding the types of injuries that each 
class member suffered, and because the defendants proffered 
uncontradicted evidence showing that class members would 
have different injuries because of the different prosthetics used 
(and thus different proofs would be required for each claim), 
the commonality requirement was not satisfied.53  Although 
lack of commonality would be enough to render the district 
court’s certification order faulty, the Sixth Circuit also 
explained that the “typicality” element was not satisfied 
because the representative plaintiffs had not used all the models 
that other class members used.54  The court also found that the 
district court failed to consider whether Vorhis would 
adequately and fairly represent the interests of the other class 
members.55 
  
B.  ARTICLE III STANDING REQUIREMENTS 
 
In comparison, “standing” typically must be met in 
every case, and its requirements are derived not only from the 




50 Id. at 1080. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1082. 
53 See id. at 1080-82. 
54 Id. at 1080-83. 
55 Id. at 1080-83. 
 
86                     5 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2017) 
 
Constitution, but also prudential concerns.56  Article III’s case 
or controversy language requires litigants to show that they 
have suffered an “injury-in-fact”, that the injury is “fairly 
traceable” to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury 
will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.57  The first step 
is to determine whether plaintiffs have satisfied the “injury-in-
fact” requirement. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proof, and must 
clearly allege facts satisfying each element.58  To establish an 
“injury-in-fact”, a plaintiff must prove the “‘invasion of a 
legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ 
and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”59  An 
injury is “particularized” if it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a 
personal and individual way.”60  A “concrete” injury means 
that the injury must actually exist.61  The next step is determine 
whether the injury is caused by the defendant’s unlawful 
actions and is redressable by the court.62  If these elements are 
satisfied, the plaintiff has standing. 
 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
The federal circuits are currently split on whether 
putative unnamed class members in a class action lawsuit must 
possess standing.63  The majority of circuits hold that a class 
                                                          
56 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (articulating a 
prudential limitation on standing—i.e. the prohibition against 
generalized grievances). 
57 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also Spokeo v. Robbins, 
136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in 
the traditional understanding of a case or controversy. The doctrine 
developed in our case law to ensure that federal courts do not exceed 
their authority as it has been traditionally understood.”). 
58 Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1545. 
59 Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan 504 U.S. at 560). 
60 Id. (quoting 504 U.S. at 560, n.1). 
61 Id. 
62 See e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 727, 751 (1984). 
63 Compare Denney v. Deutsche Bank, 443 F.3d 253, 263-64 (2d Cir. 
2006) (standing required), and Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,, 666 
F.3d 581, 594 (9th 2011) (standing required), and Halvorson v. Auto-
Owners Ins. Co., 718 F.3d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 2013) (standing required), 
 




action lawsuit cannot be certified under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 if the class contains members who lack standing.64  
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eighth, 
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits reason that standing is an irreducible 
constitutional minimum that must always be met.65  Thus, a 
class must be defined in such a way that all class members 
would possess standing (the “majority rule”).66  In contrast, the 
United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Third, and 
Seventh Circuits each hold that unnamed putative class 
members need not establish standing; rather, the “cases or 
controversies” requirement is satisfied so long as a class 
representative has standing (the “minority rule”).67  The United 
States Supreme Court has yet to explicitly resolve the issue.    
 
A.  THE MAJORITY RULE 
 
 The Second Circuit was the first circuit to address the 
issue of putative unnamed class members and standing.  In 
Denney v. Deutsche Bank, the representative plaintiffs alleged 
that Deutsche Bank and other defendants had engaged in 
“improper and fraudulent tax counseling.”68  Specifically, the 
plaintiffs alleged that they were misled by defendants about the 
legal validity of certain tax strategies—which were created and 
marketed by defendants—involving the purchase of foreign 
                                                          
and In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.-MDL. No. 1869, 
725 F.3d 244, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (standing required), with Kohen v. 
Pacific Inv. Mgmt Co., LLC, 571 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(standing not required), and Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 
F.3d 353, 363 (3d Cir. 2015) (standing not required), and 
AstraZenecaAstrazeneca AB v. UFCW (In re Nexium Antitrust 
Litig.), 777 F.3d 9, 25 (1st. Circ. 2015) (standing not required). 
64 Denney, 443 F.3d at 263-64; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 581; Halvorson, 718 
F.3d at 779; Rail Freight, 725 F.3d at 252. 
65 See Denney, 443 F.3d at 263-64; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 581; Halvorson, 
718 F.3d at 779; Rail Freight, 725 F.3d at 252. 
66 See Denney, 443 F.3d at 263-64; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 581; Halvorson, 
718 F.3d at 779; Rail Freight, 725 F.3d at 252. 
67 Kohen, 571 F.3d at 676; Neale, 794 F.3d at 363; UFCW, 777 F.3d at 
25. 
68 443 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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currency options.69  Ultimately, a settlement was reached 
between the parties and was approved by the district court.70  
The court also certified the class pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23.71  The defendants and one group of 
plaintiffs appealed the district court’s order approving the final 
settlement and certifying the class.72  The appellants argued—
inter alia—that class certification was improper because the 
class included two groups of persons who did not have Article 
III standing.73 
First, the Second Circuit noted that, even though the 
district court did not expressly address the issue of standing 
raised by appellants, the court must “consider any standing 
issue, as it speaks to [the court’s] jurisdiction over th[e] 
action.”74  The court explained that standing is a threshold 
question in every case—and it does not matter whether the suit 
is filed as a class action or not.75  Second, the court stated that 
each member of the class need not submit evidence of personal 
standing;76 however, “[t]he class must therefore be defined in 
such a way that anyone within it would have standing.”77   
With this new rule, the court analyzed whether the two 
groups within the plaintiff’s class possessed standing.78  The 
                                                          
69 Id. at 259. 
70 Id. at 261. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 262. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 263, n.3 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 
230-31 (1990)). 
75 Id. at 263 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). 
76 Id. at 263-64.  This is because represented members in a class action 
are “passive members,” and the issue of standing focuses on 
whether the Plaintiff is rightfully before the court.  Id. (citing HERBERT 
B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.7 (4th 
ed. 2002)). 
77 Id. at 264. 
78 Id. at 263. The court also recognized the familiar rule that in order 
to determine standing, the court “‘must accept as true all material 
allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in 
favor of the complaining party’ (i.e., the class members).”  See id. 
(quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.)   
 




appellants argued that two groups of persons within the 
plaintiff’s class did not suffer an “injury in fact” because they 
were “future risk” plaintiffs.79  The first group had not yet been 
audited by the Internal Revenue Service and the second group 
never received an opinion by defendants affirming the legal 
validity of the tax strategy.80  The court rejected the appellants’ 
argument.81  
First, the court reasoned that there is a difference 
between a “legal interest” and the concept of “injury-in-fact”: 
[A]n injury-in-fact need not be capable of 
sustaining a valid cause of action under 
applicable tort law.  An injury-in-fact may 
simply be the fear or anxiety of future harm.  For 
example, exposure to toxic or harmful 
substances has been held sufficient to satisfy the 
Article III injury-in-fact requirement even 
without physical symptoms of injury caused by 
the exposure, and even though exposure may 
not provide sufficient ground for a claim under 
state tort law.82      
Second, the so-called “future risk” plaintiffs suffered “injuries 
in fact” because, according to the allegations in the complaint, 
they were given fraudulent tax counseling, relied on said 
counseling, and suffered harm because of it.83  The court 
explained that the other elements of standing were also met 
because the plaintiff’s class was “limited to persons who 
received and took actions in reliance on the allegedly 
fraudulent or negligent tax advice provided by defendants, and 
the asserted injuries-in-fact were a direct result of that 
reliance.”84 
 Next, in Mazza v. Am. Honda,85 plaintiffs brought a class 
action lawsuit against American Honda Motor Company.86  The 
                                                          
79 Id. at 264. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 264-65 (citing Whitmore v Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).   
83 Id. at 265. 
84 Id. at 266.  
85 666 F.3d 581 (9th 2011). 
86 Id. at 585. 
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plaintiffs alleged that Honda violated California’s Unfair 
Competition Law (“UCL”) when its advertisements 
misrepresented the qualities of certain braking systems 
contained within Acura RLs.87 Honda appealed the district 
court’s decision to certify the class action lawsuit, arguing—
among other things—that the class included members who did 
not suffer an “injury in fact” because, under California’s UCL, 
“restitution is available to class members without 
individualized proof of deception, reliance, or injury.”88   
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit court 
disagreed with Honda’s standing argument.89  First, the court 
explained that “no class may be certified that contains members 
lacking Article III standing.”90  Next, because of Honda’s 
deceptive advertising, plaintiffs’ class members paid more than 
they otherwise would have paid.91  Thus, the court held, “[t]o 
the extent that class members were relieved of their money by 
Honda's deceptive conduct—as Plaintiffs allege—they have 
suffered an ‘injury in fact.’”92  Notably, the Ninth Circuit 
deviated from its prior decision, Stearns, which followed the 
minority rule; however, it did not expressly overrule Stearns.93   
 The Eighth Circuit also followed the majority rule in 
Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.94  In Halvorson, plaintiffs sued 
Auto-Owners Insurance Company, alleging that the company 
failed to exercise good faith when the company breached its 
personal injury protection insurance policy with 
policyholders.95  The class members included all policyholders 
in the states of Minnesota and North Dakota who submitted 
claims for medical expenses under their policies and received 
less than their policies allowed.96  Specifically, plaintiffs took 
                                                          
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 595 (citing In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 320, 93 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 559, 207, P.3d 20 (Cal. 2009)). 
89 Id. at 594. 
90 Id. (citing Denney, 443 F.3d at 264). 
91 Id. at 595 (quoting Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 
1021 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
92 Id. 
93 Compare id at 594, with Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1021. 
94 718 F.3d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 2013). 
95 Id. at 774. 
96 Id. 
 




issue with Auto-Owners’ method for calculating and paying 
out an individual policyholder’s claim.97  Auto-Owners 
appealed the district court’s decision to certify plaintiff’s class 
from North Dakota, arguing that certification was improper 
because individual questions predominated over common 
questions and certain class members lacked standing.98  
 The court accepted both of Auto-Owners’ arguments.99  
First, the court noted that, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3), a “class action may be maintained if 
‘questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.’”100  According to the court, in the present case 
“the individual questions necessary to determine breach of 
contract and bad faith include whether a provider's charge was 
usual and customary and, thus, whether the claim payment was 
reasonable.”101  Because these individual questions would 
predominate over the larger question of whether Auto-Owners 
processed claims in bad faith, F.R.C.P. 23(B)(3) is not satisfied.102 
Finally, the court explained that some members of 
plaintiff’s class would, by definition, not have standing because 
they did not suffer any damages.103  The court distinguished 
plaintiff’s case from In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig.,104 
a case involving a class action lawsuit based on a defendant’s 
alleged violation of a statute.105  In Zurn, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found standing even though 
certain members of the class did not suffer any damages.106  
Unlike Zurn, the plaintiffs in Halvorson were not relying on the 
defendant’s alleged violation of a statute conferring upon them 
                                                          
97 Id. at 775. 
98 Id. at 778. 
99 Id. at 780. 
100 Id. at 778 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). 
101 Id. at 779. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 644 F.3d 604, 630 (8th Cir. 2011). 
105 Halvorson, 718 F.3d 773, 779 (citing Zurn, 644 F.3d at 630). 
106 Id. at 779. 
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a right to sue.107  Thus, the court found that lack of standing was 
another reason to overrule the district court’s decision to certify 
plaintiff’s class.108  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
is the last circuit to follow the majority rule.  In re Rail Freight 
Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation109 involved a class action 
lawsuit—consisting primarily of parties utilizing several 
railroads for freight shipment—filed against the railroads, 
alleging that they had engaged in a “price-fixing conspiracy” 
by imposing fuel surcharges on shipments, which allegedly 
violated certain antitrust laws.110  The district court certified the 
class, despite the fact that it contained members who suffered 
no injury.111  In part, the district court relied on the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning regarding absent class members and class 
standing.112  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that 
the plaintiffs needed to show that all class members suffered an 
injury-in-fact.113  The court reasoned that if the plaintiffs did not 
make such a showing, “individual trials [would be] necessary 
to establish whether a particular shipper suffered harm from 
the price-fixing scheme.”114        
 
B.  THE MINORITY RULE 
 
 The Seventh, Third, and First Circuits are the only 
circuits to deviate from the majority rule.  First, in Kohen v. 
Pacific Mgmt Co.,115 a class action lawsuit was filed by 
purchasers of certain futures contracts against a group of 
defendants, Pacific Investment Management Company, LLC 
(PIMCO), for allegedly violating the Commodity Exchange Act 
by “cornering the market.”116  PIMCO appealed the district 
                                                          
107 See id. 
108 Id. at 779-80. 
109 725 F.3d 244 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
110 Id. at 247. 
111 Id. at 255. 
112 See id. at 255 (quoting Kohen, 571 F.3d at 677). 
113 Id. at 252. 
114 Id. 
115 571 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2009). 
116 Id. at 674-75. 
 




court’s certification of plaintiff’s class, arguing that it was error 
for the judge not to determine which class members suffered 
damages.117  Judge Richard Posner rejected PIMCO’s argument, 
holding that Article III’s standing requirement is met if the class 
representative has standing.118 Posner explained:     
If the case goes to trial, this plaintiff may fail to 
prove injury. But when a plaintiff loses a case 
because he cannot prove injury the suit is not 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction 
established at the pleading stage by a claim of 
injury that is not successfully challenged at that 
stage is not lost when at trial the plaintiff fails to 
substantiate the allegation of injury; instead the 
suit is dismissed on the merits. Pressed at 
argument, PIMCO's counsel retreated, conceded 
or at least seemed to concede that the issue was 
not jurisdictional, and clarified that his 
argument was only that the class members 
lacked ‘statutory standing.’ Then he took back 
his concession, arguing that if any class member 
were found not to have sustained damages, the 
court would have no jurisdiction over that class 
member, who would therefore not be bound by 
any judgment or settlement and so could bring 
his own suit for damages. That is to say that if a 
plaintiff loses his case, this shows that he had no 
standing to sue and therefore can start over. That 
would be an absurd result, and PIMCO need not 
fear it.119 
Next, in AstraZeneca AB v. UFCW (In re Nexium Antitrust 
Litigation),120 class action plaintiffs—certain union funds—sued 
defendant drug manufacturers and others, alleging patent and 
antitrust violations.121  A federal district court certified the class 
even though the class, by definition, contained members who 
                                                          
117 Id. at 676. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 677 (internal citations omitted). 
120 777 F.3d 9 (1st. Cir. 2015). 
121 Id. at 13-15. 
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had suffered no “injury-in-fact”.122  The defendants appealed 
the certification decision, which the First Circuit reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard.123  The defendants 
argued that because the class included members who had not 
been injured, the class lacked Article III standing.124  The First 
Circuit disagreed.125  The court concluded that, because the 
named plaintiffs proved standing, the class therefore had 
standing.126        
Finally, in Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC,127 plaintiffs 
filed a class action against Volvo Cars of North America, LLC, 
and others, for the sale of allegedly defective vehicles.128  The 
district court certified plaintiff’s class, which included 
purchasers of the allegedly defective vehicle within six states.129  
Volvo appealed the district court’s decision to certify the class, 
arguing that the class contained putative, unnamed members 
who lacked standing.130  Ultimately, the Third Circuit 
remanded the case back to the district court; however, it 
rejected Volvo’s standing argument.131  
The Third Circuit held that “unnamed, putative class 
members need not establish Article III standing. Instead, the 
‘cases or controversies’ requirement is satisfied so long as a 
class representative has standing, whether in the context of a 
settlement or litigation class.”132  First, the court reasoned that 
this holding was compelled by its prior decision, In re Prudential 
Insurance Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions,133 
                                                          
122 Id. at 14, 17 (this is because several of the class members would 
have continued to purchase the brand name drug even if the generic 
brand was on the market). 
123 Id. at 17. 
124 Id. at 31. 
125 Id. at 32. 
126 Id. (“The named plaintiffs thus have standing to sue for their 
injuries and to request, under Rule 23(b)(3), that the court allow 
them to represent and secure a judgment on behalf of a class.”). 
127 794 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2015). 
128 Id. at 356. 
129 Id. at 357. 
130 Id. at 358. 
131 Id. at 358, 375. 
132 Id. at 362. 
133 148 F.3d 283, 290-92 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 




where the Third Circuit held that only the named 
representative plaintiff in a settlement class needs to establish 
standing.134   
The difference between the two cases was that Neale 
involved a litigation class, whereas Prudential involved a 
settlement class.135  Second, the court examined the history of 
representative lawsuits—including class action suits—and 
explained that “a class action is a representative action brought 
by a named plaintiff or plaintiffs. Named plaintiffs are the 
individuals who seek to invoke the court's jurisdiction and they 
are held accountable for satisfying jurisdiction.”136  Thus, only 
the named class plaintiff need establish Article III standing.137 
 
IV. ARTICLE III IS SATISFIED SO LONG AS THE CLASS  
REPRESENTATIVE HAS STANDING 
 
In O’Shea v. Littleton,138 a § 1983 class action lawsuit was 
filed against certain officials in Alexander County, Illinois.139  
The plaintiffs alleged that the officials engaged in 
unconstitutional conduct with respect to the administration of 
criminal justice.140  However, none of the representative 
plaintiffs, at the time the suit was initiated, suffered any 
injury.141   The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked 
Article III standing.142  The Court reasoned that “if none of the 
named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the 
requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none 
may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the 
class.”143  Left unanswered was the question of whether 
                                                          
134 Neale, 794 F.3d at 363 (citing Prudential, 148 F.3d at 290-92). 
135 Compare id. at 357, with Prudential, 148 F.3d at 290-92. 
136 Neale, 794 F.3d at 363-64. 
137 Id. at 364. 
138 414 U.S. 488 (1974).   
139 O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 490-91. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 495-96. 
142 Id. at 493. 
143 Id. at 494 (citing Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33, (1962) 
(emphasis added)). 
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putative, unnamed class members must establish Article III 
standing.144   
 The lower courts are sharply divided over the question 
left unanswered in O’Shea.145  At minimum, four circuits adhere 
to the majority rule, which requires all class members to possess 
standing as a prerequisite for class certification.146  Three 
circuits follow the minority rule, requiring only that the named 
class representative needs to demonstrate standing.147  This 
article argues that the minority rule is correct because it is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Tyson v. 
Bouaphakeo148 and Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lewis v. 
Casey.149  The purpose of class action devices—judicial 
efficiency—is also served by the minority rule.150  
 
A.  THE MINORITY RULE IS COMPELLED BY SUPREME 
COURT PRECEDENT 
 




Lewis v. Casey151 involved a class action lawsuit filed by 
inmates in prisons run by the Arizona Department of 
Corrections (“ADOC”).152  The inmates alleged that the 
petitioners violated the Supreme Court’s decision in Bounds v. 
Smith,153 where the Court held that “‘the fundamental 
constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison 
authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of 
                                                          
144 See id. at 494. 
145 See supra Part III. 
146 Denney, 443 F.3d at 263-64; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 581; Halvorson, 
718 F.3d at 779; Rail Freight, 725 F.3d at 252. 
147 Kohen, 571 F.3d at 676; Neale, 794 F.3d at 363; UFCW, 777 F.3d at 
25. 
148 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). 
149 518 U.S. 343 (1996).  See infra Part IV.a., b. 
150 See infra Part IV.c. 
151 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
152 Id. at 346. 
153 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
 




meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate 
law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the 
law.’”154  Specifically, the inmates alleged that their 
Constitutional rights were violated because the petitioners did 
not adequately train law library staff, legal materials were not 
updated, illiterate and non-English speaking prisoners did not 
receive legal assistance, and prisoners in solitary confinement 
were denied access to the prison law libraries.155   
The district court below found in favor of the inmates 
and granted a permanent injunction against the petitioners.156  
Among other things, the injunction required the prisons to 
drastically increase prisoners’ access to the law library and legal 
materials within the library and mandated the training of legal 
assistance for non-English speaking and illiterate prisoners.157  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the 
district court exceeded its authority when it granted the 
permanent injunction after it found that petitioners violated the 
Court’s holding in Bounds.158  The petitioners argued that (1) the 
district court erred when it found that petitioners violated 
Bounds, and (2) the district court’s finding of individual injuries 
did not warrant the broad injunction.159      
The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, 
started with the proposition that a violation of Bounds requires 
a plaintiff to allege an injury-in-fact, which is also an essential 
requirement for Article III standing.160  Next, the court 
disagreed with respondents’ interpretation of Bounds.  First, the 
court explained that the decision in Bounds did not establish the 
expansive right that respondents wished it did—instead, 
Bounds was a narrow decision simply establishing prisoners’ 
right of access to the courts.161  Second, Bounds did not impose 
an affirmative duty on prisons to establish specific conditions 
favorable to prisoners; rather, to establish a Bounds violation, a 
                                                          
154 Lewis, 518 U.S. at 346 (quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828). 
155 Id. at 346-47. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 347-48. 
158 Id. at 348. 
159 Id. at 348-49. 
160 Id. at 349. 
161 Id. at 350, (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, 821, 828) 
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plaintiff must show “that the alleged shortcomings in the 
library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to 
pursue a legal claim.”162         
With this new formulation of Bounds, the Court 
examined the district court’s finding of injuries and decision to 
grant a broad, permanent injunction.163  First, the Court noted 
that the district court found that at least two prisoners suffered 
injuries because of ADOC’s policies: one inmate—a slow 
reader—had a case dismissed with prejudice and another 
inmate was unable to file a legal action.164  Notably, in dicta, the 
Court stated that “[t]he general allegations of the complaint in 
the present case may well have sufficed to claim injury by 
named plaintiffs, and hence standing to demand remediation . 
. . ;” however, whether these injuries justified the district court’s 
broad injunction was another question entirely.165  This is 
because “[t]he  remedy must of course be limited to the 
inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has 
established.”166  Finally, the Court concluded that the district 
court’s finding of two individual injuries was wholly 
inadequate to support the broad injunction.167 
Justice Thomas joined the majority’s narrowing of 
Bounds and its conclusion that the district court below exceeded 
its authority when it issued the injunction.168  However, Justice 
Thomas wrote that the majority did not go far enough with its 
position on Bounds—because, according to Justice Thomas, 
while the right of access to the courts is valid, there is “no basis 
in the Constitution – and …Bounds cited none – for …the right 
                                                          
162  Id. at 351 (“He might show, for example, that a complaint he 
prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical 
requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison's legal 
assistance facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had 
suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the 
courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he 
was unable even to file a complaint.”). 
163 Id. at 356-57. 
164 Id. at 357-58. 
165 Id. at 357. 
166 Id. (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88, 89 (1995)).   
167 Id. at 359-60 (citing Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 
417 (1977); Califano, 442 U.S. at 702). 
168 Id. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 




to have the government finance the endeavor.”169  Further, the 
district court’s decision, according to Justice Thomas, was just 
another example of the federal judiciary’s overreach, which is 
antithetical to principles of separation of powers and 
federalism.170     
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Breyer, 
concurred with the majority’s judgment to the extent that the 
district court was not justified—based on its factual findings of 
injury—in granting the permanent injunction.171  Specifically, 
Justice Souter acknowledged that the district court’s finding 
that the prisons generally had complete libraries did not 
support the broad injunction, which, among other things, 
“imposed detailed rules and requirements upon each of the 
State's prison libraries, including rules about library hours, 
supervision of prisoners within the facilities, request forms, 
educational and training requirements for librarians and their 
staff members, prisoners' access to the stacks, and inventory.”172   
Justice Souter disagreed, however, with several of the 
majority’s statements regarding standing.173  First, Justice 
Souter noted that, because the majority acknowledged that at 
least one class representative had standing, awarding class-
wide relief did not require a showing that “some or all of the 
unnamed class could themselves satisfy the standing 
requirements for named plaintiffs.”174  Justice Souter explained: 
[Unnamed plaintiffs] need not make any 
individual showing of standing [in order to 
obtain relief], because the standing issue focuses 
on whether the plaintiff is properly before the 
court, not whether represented parties or absent 
class members are properly before the court. 
Whether or not the named plaintiff who meets 
individual standing requirements may assert the 
rights of absent class members is neither a 
                                                          
169 Id.  
170 Id. at 385. 
171 Id. at 393 (Souter, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
concurring in the judgment). 
172 Id. at 397. 
173 Id. at 393. 
174 Id. at 395. 
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standing issue nor an Article III case or 
controversy issue but depends rather on 
meeting the prerequisites of Rule 23 governing 
class actions.175 
Justice Souter concluded that, under the majority’s view, for a 
class plaintiff to establish standing, a court may be required to 
examine the merits of a plaintiff’s complaint instead of merely 
the allegations contained therein.176  This would be contrary to 
traditional understandings of Article III standing 
requirements.177  
Finally, Justice Stevens wrote his opinion, where he 
primarily dissented from the majority’s reasoning, although he 
agreed with the decision to remand the case back to the district 
court to modify the injunction.178  Justice Stevens’ primary 
objection was that the majority was incorrect to narrow Bounds, 
address standing, and address the district court’s decision to 
certify the class action lawsuit because these issues were never 
raised by petitioners.179  Thus, he was unable to join the 
majority’s opinion.180 
 
2. ANALYSIS  
 
For some, Lewis v. Casey stands for the proposition that 
the constitutional protections laid out in Bounds have been 
drastically scaled back.181  This may be true, but the case also 
has implications for standing and class-action lawsuits.  To be 
sure, Lewis is not a typical standing case: the majority’s decision 
                                                          
175 Id. (quoting 1 H. NEWBERG & A. CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 2.07, pp. 2-40 to 2-41 (3d ed. 1992)). 
176 Id. at 399. 
177 Id. at 399-402. 
178 See, e.g., David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1459 (2010)  
(“In the wake  
 
181 See, e.g., David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1459 (2010) (“In the wake of Casey, many prison 
systems dramatically cut back on their law libraries; some eliminated 
them entirely. . .”) (citing Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1633 n. 268 (2003)). 
 




to address standing—even though a trial had already 
commenced, and even though petitioners never objected to 
standing in the first place—should be treated as dicta because it 
was not essential to the majority’s holding.182  However, Justice 
Souter’s concurrence supports the proposition that the minority 
rule—that putative unnamed class members need not establish 
standing—is the correct rule.183 
While the Lewis majority may have heightened the 
requirements of standing when a plaintiff is asserting a Bounds 
violation and denied standing to certain plaintiffs, the majority 
never explicitly addressed the issue of unnamed class members 
and standing.184  However, Justice Souter’s concurrence 
expressly adopted the minority rule.185  In his concurrence, 
Justice Souter stated that so long as the class representative of a 
class action lawsuit has standing, a court need not determine 
whether unnamed class members also have standing.186  Justice 
Souter also agreed with the majority that at least two of the class 
plaintiffs possessed standing to bring the suit.187  In sum, Justice 
                                                          
182 See Lewis, 518 U.S 343, 358; see also id. at 407 (Stevens, J. 
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
judgment).   Dicta can be defined as “[a] judicial comment made 
while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the 
decision in the case and therefore not precedential.”  Michael 
Abramowicz, Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 
959 (2005) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (8th ed. 2004)).  
Nevertheless, this view is consistent with Justice Scalia’s approach to 
standing.  Compare Lewis, 518 U.S. at 358, with Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198-215 (2000) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting). 
183 In fact, the United State Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
noted that other circuits relied on Lewis when adhering to the 
minority rule.  See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 800-01. 
184 See generally id. 
185 Compare Lewis, 518 U.S at 395 (Souter, J. concurring in part, 
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment), with Kohen, 571 
F.3d at 676, and Neale, 794 F.3d at 363, and UFCW, 777 F.3d at 25. 
186 Lewis, 518 U.S at 395 (Souter, J. concurring in part, dissenting in 
part, and concurring in the judgment) (quoting 1 H. NEWBERG & A. 
CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.07, pp. 2-40 to 2-41 (3d ed. 
1992)). 
187 Id. at 395 (Souter, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
concurring in the judgment). 
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Souter’s concurrence is persuasive authority supporting the 
notion that the minority rule is correct.188   
 




In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,189 employees for Tyson 
Foods, Inc., working at a processing plant, filed a class action 
lawsuit against their employer.190  The employees claimed that 
they were denied compensation for time spent changing in and 
out of protective gear, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, which requires employers to compensate their employees 
for time spent on activities integral to their work.191  When the 
case was initially filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Iowa, Tyson Foods argued that “because of the 
variance in protective gear each employee wore, the employees’ 
claims were not sufficiently similar to be resolved on a 
classwide basis.”192  The district court rejected Tyson’s 
argument and certified the class.193 
The case ultimately went to trial.194  In order to recover 
unpaid wages under the FLSA, the employees needed to show 
that they each worked over 40 hours per week, including time 
spent changing in and out of protective gear.195  However, 
because Tyson did not maintain records of these times, 
“representative evidence” was used by the parties at trial.196  
First, an “industrial relations expert” proffered an estimate of 
average time spent by employees changing in and out of 
                                                          
188 See id. at 395 (Souter, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
concurring in the judgment) (quoting 1 H. NEWBERG & A. CONTE, 
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2.07, pp. 2-40 to 2-41 (3d ed. 1992)). 
189 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). 
190 Id. at 1042. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 1043. 
193 Id. 








protective gear.197  Second, the employees’ expert witness used 
the industrial relations expert’s estimate to come up with 
specific estimates as to the “amount of uncompensated work 
each employee did . . . .”198  With this estimate, the employees’ 
expert asked the jury for almost $7 million in unpaid wages.199      
A jury found that the time employees spent changing 
gear was compensable time.200  The jury awarded almost $3 
million in unpaid wages to the workers, roughly half the 
amount the employees’ expert witness testified the employees 
were owed.201  Tyson moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
jury verdict.202  The Northern District of Ohio overruled Tyson’s 
motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
affirmed.203  The Supreme Court granted Tyson’s petition for 
writ of certiorari.204  Tyson argued, inter alia, that the district 
court’s decision to certify plaintiff’s class was improper because 
some members of the class suffered no injuries.205  Tyson also 
took issue with the fact that uninjured class members could 
receive compensation under the substantial jury award.206        
Justice Kennedy first addressed whether the class action 
was properly certified under F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3), which requires 
common questions of fact or law to “predominate” over 
individual questions.207  The Court noted that “‘the 
predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are 
sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by 
representation.’”208  The ultimate issue in Tyson was whether 
“representative” or statistical evidence—used in the case by the 
employees’ expert witnesses to provide estimates of (1) the 
                                                          
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 1043-44. 
199 Id. at 1044. 




204 Id. at 1041. 
205 See Pet. for Writ of Cert, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 2015 
WL 1285369, at *i (Mar. 19, 2015). 
206 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1049. 
207 Id. at 1045 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)). 
208 Id.  (quoting Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 
(1997)). 
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average time spent by employees changing in and out of 
protective gear and (2) uncompensated time spent by each 
employee working—was admissible in class action lawsuits.209 
Tyson requested a broad rule prohibiting such 
representative evidence to be used in class action suits.210  Tyson 
contended that “[r]eliance on a representative sample . . . 
absolves each employee of the responsibility to prove personal 
injury, and thus deprives [Tyson] of any ability to litigate its 
defenses to individual claims.”211  Thus, Tyson argued that the 
“predominance” test was not met, and the district court 
improperly certified the employees’ class.212  The Court 
disagreed.213  The Court explained that the admissibility of such 
evidence should not depend on whether the case is an 
individual or class action lawsuit; rather, admissibility of 
representative evidence—like any evidence—is dependent on 
its relevance and reliability.214   
Next, the Court declined to address Tyson’s standing 
argument because Tyson conceded this point when the case 
reached the Supreme Court.215  Instead, the Court addressed 
Tyson’s new argument that the employees needed to provide a 
way of preventing uninjured class members from receiving 
money damages.216  The Court agreed with Tyson that 
uninjured class members would have no legal right to damages; 
however, the damages award had not yet been disbursed.217  
Thus, the district court would be able to review the award on 
remand.218 
Chief Justice Roberts, with Justice Alito, joined the 
majority opinion in full, concurring only to express concern 
regarding the district court’s ability – upon remand – “to  
fashion a method for awarding damages only to those class 
                                                          















members who suffered an actual injury.”219  First, it was 
undisputed that many members of the class did not suffer an 
injury in the case at all.220  Second, the jury awarded the 
employees a lump-sum damages award “without specifying 
any particular amount of donning and doffing time used to 
calculate that number.”221  Thus, instead of rendering the jury 
award invalid—as requested by Tyson—Chief Justice Roberts 
explained that the best course of action would be to leave the 
jury award intact, but to remand to the district court to find a 
way to disburse the award without awarding uninjured class 
members.222  In short, “Article III does not give federal courts 
the power to order relief to any uninjured plaintiff, class action 
or not.”223  Finally, Justice Thomas dissented from the majority 
opinion.224  Justice Thomas explained that the majority should 
have reversed the district court’s order certifying the 
employees’ class because the predominance factor was not 
met.225  Justice Thomas was primarily concerned with the 
Court’s decision to allow the use of representative evidence.226    
 
2. ANALYSIS  
  
The Supreme Court is more likely to grant petitions for 
writ of certiorari when the federal circuits are split on an 
important matter.227  In Tyson, many expected the Supreme 
Court to resolve the split over whether absent class members 
need to establish standing before class certification.228  As noted 
                                                          
219 Id. at 1050 (Roberts, CJ., concurring). 
220 Id. at 1051 (Roberts, CJ., concurring). 
221 Id. (Roberts, CJ., concurring). 
222 Id. at 1052-53 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).  
223 Id. at 1053 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).  
224 Id. at 1056-61 (Thomas,, J., dissenting). 
225 Id. at 1056-61 (Thomas,, J., dissenting). 
226 Id. at 1056-61 (Thomas,, J., dissenting). 
227 See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). 
228 See, e.g. Theane Evangelis and Cynthia E. Richman, The Need to 
Establish Absent Class Member Standing, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Evangelis-
Richman-The-Need-to-Establish-Absent-Class-Member-Standing-
ABA-Oct-2015.pdf (Oct. 2015); Christopher J. Michie, Absent Class 
Members and Constitutional Standing, LAW360, 
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by the Third Circuit in Neal, the second question presented for 
review in Tyson was “[w]hether a class action may be certified 
or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective action 
certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
when the class contains hundreds of members who were not 
injured and have no legal right to any damages.”229  
Unfortunately, however, Tyson—the petitioner—abandoned 
this point, conceding that “[t]he fact that federal courts lack 
authority to compensate persons who cannot prove injury does 
not mean that a class action (or collective action) can never be 
certified in the absence of proof that all class members were 
injured.”230  Because of this concession, the Court declined to 
consider the issue.231 
Nevertheless, the Court’s decision not to address the 
issue of standing suggests that absent class members need not 
establish standing before class certification.232  The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that it has an obligation to address 
standing—even if the issue was not raised by the parties—if the 
lower court possessed no jurisdiction over the case.233  This is 
because: 
‘Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at 
all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare 
the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only 
function remaining to the court is that of 
announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’ 
Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 7 Wall. 506, 514, 
19 L. Ed. 264 (1869). ‘On every writ of error or 
appeal, the first and fundamental question is 
that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then 
                                                          
https://www.law360.com/articles/683755/absent-class-members-
and-constitutional-standing#_ednref44 (July 27, 2015). 
229 Neale, 794 F.3d at 360, n. 2, (quoting Pet. for Writ of Cert, Tyson 
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 2015 WL 1285369, at *i (Mar. 19, 2015)). 
230 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1049 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 49). 
231 Id. at 1049 (“In light of petitioner’s abandonment of its argument 
from the petition, the Court need not, and does not, address it.”) 
232 See id. 
233 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 
(2001) (“We are obliged to examine standing sua sponte where 
standing has erroneously been assumed below.”) (citing Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998)). 
 




of the court from which the record comes. This 
question the court is bound to ask and answer 
for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, 
and without respect to the relation of the parties 
to it.’ Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. 
Jones, supra, 177 U.S. 449 at 453. The 
requirement that jurisdiction be established as a 
threshold matter springs from the nature and 
limits of the judicial power of the United States" 
and is inflexible and without exception.’ 
Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 
379, 382, 28 L. Ed. 462, 4 S. Ct. 510 (1884).234 
However, in Tyson, the majority did not address the issue of 
standing, even though the petitioner raised the issue in its 
petition for certiorari (although it eventually abandoned this 
argument at the Supreme Court).235  Furthermore, in his 
concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that 
hundreds of class members did not suffer any injury yet 
declined to address standing.236  Because of its obligation to 
correct standing issues, the Court’s decision in Tyson not to 
address standing sua sponte suggests that there was never any 
real standing issue to correct in the first place.237  In other words, 
the decision suggests that unnamed putative class members 
need not establish standing—the minority rule.  A contrary 
conclusion necessarily requires an invalidation of the holding 
in Tyson due to lack of jurisdiction.238   
B.  THE MINORITY RULE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE 
OF CLASS ACTION SUITS 
                                                          
234 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). 
235 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1049. 
236 Id. at 1051 (Roberts, CJ., concurring). 
237 Compare id., at 1049, with Adarand Constructors, Inc., 534 U.S. at 
110, and Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95. 
238 See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94-95 (“Without jurisdiction the 
court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”) (quoting Ex parte 
McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 7 Wall. 506, 514, 19 L. Ed. 264 (1869)).  But see 
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (examining Establishment Clause 
challenges to tax credits that the Court had decided on the merits 
before ruling in Winn that the plaintiffs lacked standing). 
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“Judicial economy” is defined as “[e]fficiency in the 
management of a particular litigation or of the courts in general; 
refers to measures taken to avoid unnecessary effort or expense 
on the part of the court or the court system.”239  Class action 
lawsuits generally promote judicial economy by allowing a 
single representative to sue on behalf of many similarly situated 
individuals when it would be more efficient to do so.240  In 
Califano v. Yamasaki,241 the Supreme Court explained that class 
action lawsuits are “an exception to the usual rule that litigation 
is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties 
only.”242  “[T]he class-action device saves the resources of both 
the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially 
affecting every class member to be litigated in an economical 
fashion under Rule 23.”243  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
aim to facilitate this purpose.244    
The minority rule promotes judicial efficiency because it 
is consistent with the nature of class action lawsuits.  The 
minority rule only requires class representatives to possess 
standing.245  This is because “a class action is a representative 
action brought by a named plaintiff or plaintiffs. Named 
plaintiffs are the individuals who seek to invoke the court's 
jurisdiction and they are held accountable for satisfying 
jurisdiction.”246  In contrast, the majority rule, which prohibits 
certification of classes containing members who lack standing, 
hinders judicial efficiency.247  Indeed, the majority rule results 
in exactly what Rule 23 aims to prevent: unnecessary 
                                                          
239 WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD LAW DICTIONARY, 
http://www.yourdictionary.com/judicial-economy (last visited 
April 3, 2017). 
240 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
241 442 U.S. 682 (1979). 
242 Califano, 442 U.S. at 700-701. 
243 Id. at 700-701. 
244 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
245 See, e.g., Kohen, 571 F.3d at 676; Neale, 794 F.3d at 363; UFCW, 777 
F.3d at 25. 
246 Neale, 794 F.3d at 363-64. 
247 See, e.g., Denney, 443 F.3d at 263-64; Mazza, 666 F.3d at 581; 
Halvorson, 718 F.3d at 779; Rail Freight, 725 F.3d at 252. 
 




prosecution of separate actions by individual class members.248  
This is an inefficient use of judicial resources.249  As such, the 
minority rule is necessary to effectuate the purpose of class 
action lawsuits. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
In sum, the minority rule is compelled not only by 
Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Lewis—where he 
explicitly stated that only a class representative needs to 
demonstrate standing—but also by the Court’s opinion in 
Tyson.250  The Court’s decision in Tyson not to address the issue 
of whether a class can be certified when absent class members 
lack standing—even though this issue was raised by the 
petitioner and the Court has repeatedly held that it has an 
obligation to address standing—suggests that only named 
plaintiffs need establish standing.251  Both of these opinions, 
examined in light of the nature of class action suits, support the 
minority rule.252  Finally, the minority rule also serves the 
purpose of class action devices, since it promotes judicial 
efficiency.253 
                                                          
248 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). 
249 But see Toby J. Stern, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates” of 
Litigation, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377 (2003) (arguing that Article III 
should generally prevent judges from deciding cases based on the 
“floodgates” argument).  Luckily, this article is not a judicial opinion. 
250 See supra Part IV. 
251 See supra Part IV. 
252 See supra Part IV. 
253 See supra Part IV. 
